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Abstract
The Pennsylvania Patient Safety Authority receives over 235,000
reports of medical error per year. Near miss and serious event reports
of common and interesting problems are analysed to identify best
practices for preventing harmful errors. Dissemination of this evi-
dence-based information in the peer-reviewed Pennsylvania Patient
Safety Advisory and presentations to medical staffs are not sufficient
for adoption of best practices. Adoption of best practices has required
working with institutions to identify local barriers to and incentives
for adopting best practices and redesigning the delivery system to
make desired behaviour easy and undesirable behaviour more diffi-
cult. Collaborations, where institutions can learn from the experi-
ences of others, have show decreases in harmful events. The
Pennsylvania Program to Prevent Wrong-Site Surgery is used as an
example. Two collaborations to prevent wrong-site surgery have been
completed, one with 30 institutions in eastern Pennsylvania and one
with 19 in western Pennsylvania. The first collaboration achieved a
73% decrease in the rolling average of wrong-site events over 18
months. The second collaboration experienced no wrong-site operat-
ing room procedures over more than one year.
Introduction
Pennsylvania mandates that any medical event, involving the clini-
cal care of a patient in a licensed acute care facility, that either results
in an unanticipated injury (serious event) or could have injured the
patient (near-miss incident) be reported to the Pennsylvania Patient
Safety Authority.1 Pennsylvania is the only state mandating the report-
ing of near-miss incidents. Under the state statute, all individual
reports are protected by confidentiality; they are not legally discover-
able or admissible as evidence or subject to disclosure under right-to-
know laws. Information identifying the patient or the healthcare per-
sonnel must be not reported. The Patient Safety Authority supervises
the analysis of over 235,000 reports per year from over 550 hospitals,
ambulatory surgical centres, and other facilities.2 The reports are clas-
sified by over 200 event types. Over 96% of the reported events are
near-miss incidents. 
Analyses of the causes of the medical errors and evidence-based
best practices to prevent the errors are published in the Pennsylvania
Patient Safety Advisory (Advisory),3 a quarterly peer-reviewed online
journal indexed in the NLM Catalogue and CINAHL® Plus.
Subscription to this online journal is free. The journal is distributed to
over 4650 healthcare providers in Pennsylvania, in addition to over
4000 subscribers in all 50 states and 37 other countries (unpublished
data). The Patient Safety Authority permits reproduction of Advisory
articles provided the source is clearly attributed. Analytic reviews are
accompanied by learning objectives and self-assessment questions
that are linked to continuing medical education credits and nursing
continuing education credits from the Pennsylvania Medical Society
and Pennsylvania State Nurses Association, respectively. Over 440
articles have been published in over 40 issues of the Advisory.
The process of reporting and analysing medical errors has provided
an infrastructure for identifying and correcting system weaknesses
with some successes, such as the standardization of wristband colours
to unambiguously communicate important patient information at the
bedside and in transit.4 Aggregation of reports for analysis has also
permitted detection of multiple weakness that can lead to rare events,
such as fires on the surgical field, which occur an average of only once
every 300,000 operations, but are reported ten times per year across
the state.5 Dissemination of information from the analysis of reports
also, anecdotally, encourages reporting, which increases awareness of
system weaknesses. 
However, the experience of the Patient Safety Authority has been
that solely describing a patient safety problem and warning people to
be more careful is – as might be expected – ineffective. Proposing a
best practice without proposing how to implement and disseminate
the practice in an institution’s healthcare delivery system does not
produce the desired reduction in errors. An excellent example is the
Patient Safety Authority’s efforts to prevent wrong-site surgery.6
The Pennsylvania Patient Safety Authority’sprogram to prevent wrong-site surgery
In mid-2007, the Patient Safety Authority began a program to pre-
vent wrong-site surgery with an analysis of all wrong-site events and
near-misses in Pennsylvania operating rooms (ORs).7 Eventually 21
evidence based best practices were identified for preventing wrong-
site surgery, from identifying the correct site of the operation when
scheduling the procedure to using intra-operative radiological confir-
mation to verify the correct vertebral level during spinal surgery.8
Articles on preventing wrong-site surgery have been published in
every quarterly issue of the Advisory since June, 2007.9 However, the
number of events for each quarter of the academic year 2009-2010
(16) was the same as for the first quarter of data collection in 2004
Significance for public health
Since the Institute of Medicine’s To Err is Human identified medical errors
as a major cause of death, the public has been interested in the recommen-
dations for reporting of medical errors and implementing safe systems for
the delivery of healthcare. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has followed
those recommendations and found that an essential intermediate step
between analysing reports and implementing safe systems is collaborative
learning among healthcare institutions. The experience in Pennsylvania
should be useful to other public organizations wishing to improve safety.
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(16).10 This lack of effect might have been predicted. McGlynn has
shown that patients receive, on average, 55%, of recommended prac-
tices.11 Because of the lack of progress in eliminating wrong-site sur-
gery through the presentation of evidence-based best practices,8 the
Patient Safety Authority added collaborative learning in an attempt to
improve compliance with those practices.
Collaborative learning
Dissemination of innovation in healthcare have been well summa-
rized by Berwick.12 Successful dissemination through the use of collab-
orative learning has been nicely described by Dixon-Woods et al.13
Collaborative learning is the process of learning from each other. The
Patient Safety Authority found the following principles useful in devel-
oping its collaborative learning module to implement best practices: i)
adaption of recommended practices is a form of learning how to imple-
ment them; ii) all innovation is adapted, not adopted, for the local envi-
ronment; iii) new ideas may come from the outside, but new process-
es come from within; iv) innovations need to be adapted locally in order
to be adopted locally; v) attempts to improve recommendations do not
represent resistance.
The Patient Safety Authority collaborative learning efforts benefitted
from having key infrastructure elements already in place. The evi-
dence-based best practices were already available and did not have to
emerge as part of the collaborative learning process.8 A secure website
for collaborating institutions to confidentially share experiences, called
PassKey (for Pennsylvania Patient Safety Knowledge Exchange),
already existed.14 The Patient Safety Authority has a staff of eight
patient safety liaisons, primarily nurses and healthcare quality profes-
sionals who work directly with healthcare institutions in different geo-
graphic areas of the state to coordinate patient safety activities
between the Patient Safety Authority and the institutions.
Prior to starting the collaborative learning module, the Patient
Safety Authority interviewed patient safety officers at eight hospitals.15
Each had independently reduced its incidence of wrong-site surgery
reports from an average of one wrong-site surgery every 24 weeks for a
minimum of 3½ years to none for a minimum of 64 weeks. The themes
of these individual successes were: i) leadership – the initial commit-
ment and the on-going support of hospital leaders, including empower-
ment of the staff to stop procedures to resolve concerns and mentor
providers when their performance did not comply with best practices;
ii) education about best practices and outcomes from high-risk behav-
iour; iii) involving the providers in the detailed improvement of the
policies and procedures, described by one as commitment from the top
down, process from the bottom up; iv) standardization of practices –
throughout an institution’s system, if possible; v) development or
improvement of checklists to reinforce best practices; vi) on-going
monitoring of compliance; vii) strict enforcement, including the
empowerment of the staff to stop procedures and the counselling of
non-compliant providers. These experiences were used to guide the
focal points of the collaborative learning module. The Patient Safety
Authority recognized that institutions had to volunteer willingly to join
a collaboration, rather than be drafted. The incentives for institutions
to devote time and attention to this collaborative program, in lieu of
other priorities within their institutions, proved to be the opportunities
for external expert consultation, confidential and high-quality aggre-
gate process and outcome data, and a forum for collaboration and stan-
dardization across a network. The Patient Safety Authority has com-
pleted two collaborations to prevent wrong-site surgery, one with 30
institutions and one with 19.16,17 The collaborative learning process
was similar for both. The collaborations began with getting the commit-
ment of the executive leaders of the institutions to identify domain-
expert opinion leaders to lead the project within their institutions, pro-
vide them with adequate resources, and support means of compliance
with redesigned systems. The opinion leaders in each institution were
three champions – from the departments of surgery, anaesthesia, and
perioperative nursing, respectively.
A baseline assessment was done by these project leaders. A self-
assessment checklist was used to compare institutions policies and
procedures with the Patient Safety Authorities evidence-based princi-
ples for reliable performance of correct-site surgery.8,18 A compliance
monitoring tool (since modified) was used to record compliance with
those principles for 10 patients at each institution.19
An initial all-day conference started with a morning educational con-
ference, during which the evidence for the principles for reliable per-
formance was presented,8 and the results of the gap analysis of policies
and compliance for the group as a whole, were discussed. The after-
noon was devoted to discussions of strengths and weaknesses in the
systems of each institution using contextually de-identified events
from the Pennsylvania Patient Safety Authority’s wrong-site surgery
database as the starting points for the conversations.
The subsequent efforts of the individual project teams to improve
their systems to reliably comply with evidence-based best practices was
collaboratively supported by the confidential and secure PassKey web-
site restricted to the collaborating institutions and by conference calls
to discuss progress and problems. After six months, follow-up assess-
ments of policies and procedures and compliance with evidence-based
principles were done by the project leaders in the same manner as the
baseline assessments. A follow-up half-day conference presented the
results of those assessments, including improvements and remaining
gaps. Noteworthy successes and recalcitrant problems were discussed.
Plans were made for periodic monitoring of processes within institu-
tions and continued monitoring for wrong-site surgery by the Patient
Safety Authority, with continued Passkey collaboration, open lines of
communication with the Patient Safety Authority, and follow-up sup-
port as needed. In both collaborations, there was a lag of a few months
before the system redesign took hold and provider compliance was
achieved. The first collaboration of 30 institutions achieved a 73%
decrease in the rolling average of wrong-site events over 18 months.16
The second collaboration of 19 hospitals experienced no wrong-site OR
procedures over more than one year.17 The first collaboration provided
documentation of a 7% improvement in the alignment of policies with
evidence-based best practices (from a baseline score of 82 to a follow-
up score of 88). The most dramatic improvements were in the designa-
tion of a hospital staff person to be responsible for verifying the accu-
racy of information when the request to schedule an operation is
received, and clearly delineating his/her role in the verification process
(26.5%), using a standard mechanism for verifying the accuracy of
information when the request to schedule an operation is received,
including verifying the exact description of the surgical procedure and
specifying the surgical site (38.5%), doing a separate time out prior to
each procedure when multiple independent procedures are performed
(18.5%), and removing patient information material left from previous
surgeries when cleaning the ORs (52.5%).16
The first collaboration also documented improved compliance with
existing evidence-based best practices, e.g. including information from
the OR schedule and from the history and physical examination in the
pre-operative verification (19% and 12% improvement respectively),
marking the site after reconciliation of all documents (16% improve-
ment), conducting a timeout prior to regional or local anaesthesia (16%
improvement), having the surgeon encourage members of the surgical
team to speak up if any concerns during the time out (8% improve-
ment).16 The collective efforts of institutions that worked together to
implement best practices to prevent wrong-site surgery has resulted in
a persistent overall yearly decrease in wrong-site surgeries across
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Pennsylvania from a record high of 76 in the academic year prior to the
completion of the first collaboration to a record low of 46 this last aca-
demic year.20 Interestingly, an analysis showed that all the improvement
came from institutions that had made a documented effort to implement
best practices.21 The institutions that had not been surveyed or part of
the collaborations actually had an increase in reports of wrong-site
events over that time. Recently, a 48-month follow-up of compliance with
best practices was completed for some of the institutions in the first col-
laboration and a 22-month follow-up was completed for the institutions
in the second collaboration.22 Compliance with some best practices had
actually increased over time, most were maintained, and some had
decreased. Continued improvement in compliance with best practices
was more common than decreased compliance.
Lessons learned
Based on its initial experiences, the Patient Safety Authority con-
cludes that collaborative learning is an effective way of achieving
implementation of best practices. Educational communication with
institutions about evidence-based best practices is necessary, but not
sufficient to get compliance. It is also necessary to work with institu-
tions to adapt and adopt best practices through system changes that
make the best process the easiest to do and sub-optimal processes
harder to do. Institutions, in the form of leaders and champions, must
be motivated to change. The commitment and support of executive
leadership is critical, as efforts will require personnel time. A gap
analysis is important to capture providers’ attention and focus the
efforts as productively as possible.
One of the greatest values of collaborative learning is sharing suc-
cesses and failures with others on the same journey. Processes need to
be monitored. It seems to take time to make and see improvement.
Continued monitoring is necessary to hold the gain.
The Patient Safety Authority has not had sufficient experience with
collaborative learning to determine the best way to present improve-
ments in the correction of medical errors to the public. The keys to
holding gains are not well understood. It is unknown if successes in
implementation of best practices can be disseminated to institutions
outside of the collaborations. It is also unknown if collaborative learn-
ing is necessary to implement all evidence-based best practices. 
What is clear is that education about evidence-based best practice is
necessary but insufficient to create change. Guided efforts to imple-
ment best practice within institutions are also needed to get reliable
compliance with optimal process and the desired results.
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